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STRUCTURING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS:
THE JUDICIARY AND INSTITUTIONS
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Jesse H. Choper
The title of my response is: "Some Thoughts Stimulated by the Incisive Talk of Professor Tusbnet. " ' The subtitle is: "What Constitution
Makers Might Learn from Both the Successes and Failures of the American System of an Independent Judiciary and Its Tradition of Judicial
Review."
I.
Our system of an independent judiciary2 and its tradition of judicial
review are among the great successes of our Constitution. I agree that
one of the great achievements of the government of the United States
involves individual liberty: freedom from government oppression and
less evil government restrictions on civil rights. I believe that this is
substantially attributable to our independent judiciary and our system of
judicial review.
We have heard mentioned the freedoms protected by the constitution
of the former Soviet Union? There are many similarities between that
document and ours. For example, both the American and the Soviet
constitutions provide for freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.'
* Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California, Berkeley.

1. Mark Tushnet, The Judiciary and Institutions of Judicial Review, 8 ANL UJ.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 501 (1993).
2. U.S. CoNsT. art. M, § 1.
3. The last constitution of the former Soviet Union was published in 1977.
KONST. SSSR (1977). See also ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTTUTIoNAL DEvELoPMsNr iN

THE USSR 194-201 (1981) (commenting on the constitutionally-protected rights of
Soviet citizens).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing freedom of speech as a constitutional
right). The most recent USSR Constitution also contained a guaranteed right to free-

dom of speech. KoNST. SSSR art. 50 (1977). However, this right was recognized "in
conformity with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the
socialist state." Id. Thus, freedom of speech was protected in the former Soviet Union
only to the degree it did not undermine state goals.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The USSR Constitution contains a similar clause
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But it was an independent judiciary in the United States that protected
freedom after speech, and freedom after assembly in America, in contrast to what the situation was in the Soviet Union. This, then, is an
important topic.
II.
Professor Tushnet persuasively outlined6 the risks of other government
systems transposing our system of an independent judiciary and judicial
review into their judicial systems. It has taken our tradition 200 years to
develop and mature, and even then, I think, it is far from being fully
secure. On a number of occasions in the past decade, I have had the
opportunity to talk to people from such countries as Taiwan, Korea, the
People's Republic of China, and, more recently, from states of the former Soviet Union. I found that these people, who believe deeply in
democracy and individual liberty, and those who were judges in particular, viewed the American system of judicial review as being extremely
attractive. But two centuries of the exercise of power carries a great
deal of weight. Therefore, I share Professor Tushnet's thoughts regarding
modes of interpretation, 7 though I am not as certain that there is as
sharp a contrast between what he has labeled formalist and instrumentalist interpretation. Nonetheless, there are significant differences,
and I agree with the notion that it will take time - a decade or so is
probably not long enough - before a court in a new judicial system
can assume the sort of authority over public affairs that the United
States Supreme Court has exercised in our society.
rI.
I will briefly address two issues concerning an independent judicial
system that Professor Tushnet did not elaborate on. First, he mentioned
the question of whether a judicial system ought to have a constitutional
court (as in several western European countries) rather than what we in
the United States describe as a court of general jurisdiction. The fact is
that the United States Supreme Court is not far from being a constitutional court in that a very substantial percentage of its business concerns constitutional issues, many highly controversial. I think it is desirable to have a court with fairly limited jurisdiction, largely, but not

protecting freedom of assembly. KONST. SSSR art. 50 (1977).
6. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 501-05.
7. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 511.
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exclusively, committed to constitutional adjudication. There is a valuable
expertise that may be developed by a single court making a series of
decisions regarding a wide range of important constitutional questions.
Strong evidence of the need to develop expertise and recognized authority in constitutional law may be seen by surveying professors of a subject other than constitutional law regarding constitutional interpretation.
Generally, no matter how astute these professors may be, there is usually something missing in their overall understanding of what the Supreme
Court is doing. I think this is also true in the lower state and federal
courts in the American system. Highly conscientious and intelligent
judges may often be found either taking too literally or too seriously
what the Supreme Court has said, or putting too much weight on a
single decision without fully appreciating the larger landscape on which
the opinions are written.
On the other hand, I believe that the Supreme Court's non-exclusive
jurisdiction has had a positive effect in our system. It has enabled the
Court to make what we might call "sub-constitutional" decisions, i.e.,
ones that articulate important constitutional values but which nonetheless
rest final authority with the political branches: either Congress or the
President. It is desirable to permit the Supreme Court to render farreaching rulings by means of statutory interpretation, or by creating
federal common law principles (usually in respect to the administrative
process or the criminal justice system). This gives the political branches
an opportunity to consider the matter seriously, and it allows the Court
to have a very substantial impact without bearing ultimate responsibility
for what it has done. This is an effective self-preservation device and is
largely the system in England: powerful decision-making authority by
courts, but without ultimate political responsibility for what they do.
Second, the matter of the selection and tenure of judges merits attention. The United States has a unique system to presere the independence of judges. I think this independence accounts for a large measure
of our nation's success in enforcing what Professor Tushnet called precommitments8 - ideals that most people agreed with at the time of enactment, but which fall out of favor when pressing circumstances seem
to call for modifications. But the need for an independent judiciary does
not reveal how we ought to select the judges. Indeed, after 200 years,
we still lack a clear understanding of the respective roles of the President and the Senate in regard to selection. Strong criticism and controversy continue to surround the criteria that the President uses to make
8.

See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 506, 508-14.
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nominations, and that the Senate uses to confirm them. While this is
neither the time nor the place for well-developed proposals, I think that
this issue is entitled to careful consideration and articulation in the formation of a new constitution by a new nation, particularly if it wishes
to have a powerful judiciary.
As for length of terms, the principal purpose of giving American
federal judges life tenure has been to insure their independence. I believe that life tenure is a question that ought to be seriously reviewed in
a new system, and even reconsidered in our system, especially for a
judicial body with the policy-making role that our Supreme Court has
assumed. I say this from a non-partisan perspective. In the last several
decades we have observed liberal justices - many greatly admired, I
should say - remaining in office beyond the time that they really wish
because they do not want their successors appointed by a President with
whom they do not agree. We have also observed at least one presidential administration - a strongly conservative one - make the age of
potential nominees a prominent criterion. There may well be good reasons for appointing young people with fresh ideas and perspectives. But
I do not consider it to be a good reason to appoint them because they
promise to have an impact long after the presidential administration has
ended.
There are ways to preserve the complete independence of Supreme
Court justices and still limit the length of their terms. They can have
long terms - say 12, 15, 18 or even 20 years. They can receive full
salary after that; it wouldn't be very expensive. It might also be provided that retired justices could hold no other public office, and perhaps
even no other compensated employment at all. They could continue to
pursue interesting and useful professional lives by serving as judges on
lower federal courts, as many retired justices have done. I suggest this
matter might profitably be rethought.
IV.
Finally, there is much to be learned from the deficiencies in our constitutional system. In my view, a number of these deficiencies may even
be called failures because they go to the heart of our system of representative government. These deficiencies significantly contribute to the
inability of the elected officials in the political branches of our national
government to confront the great challenges facing the nation. It is not
that Congress is enacting oppressive legislation, and it may not even be
that it is enacting bad legislation. But the sad reality is that the political
branches refuse to deal with serious problems in the absence of some
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crisis, problems that most people, regardless of political affiliation, feel
ought to be handled in some way by our national government. For
example, to take something relatively neutral: the energy shortage.
What are some of these deficiencies of our Constitution? Briefly, I
think our experience has shown that its designated term of office of two
years for the House of Representatives is too short, particularly when its
members are as concerned as they are with their own re-election. I think
the role of financial resources in political campaigns, a subject the Supreme Court has addressed, greatly limits the nation's ability to deal
with the central problem. And I end with another very controversial
statement, one concerning the extent of protection that the First Amendment gives to the media. In this country - and there is reason to believe that it would not be substantially different in others that emulate
our system - the media play an enormous role in determining who gets
elected to public office and what those officials do when they attain
public office. The tail wags the dog: the candidates say what they know
the media will report; the media report what they believe sells well; and
substance and effective government are the eventual losers.
I think these illustrate shortcomings in our system of government that
occupy a central role in the continued vitality of the United States. In
important ways, emerging government systems have an opportunity to
make a fresh start and learn not only from our successes but from our
failures as well.

